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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of the Speaker Anti-
spoofing Competition organized by Biometric group at
Idiap Research Institute for the IEEE International Con-
ference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications, and Systems
(BTAS 2016). The competition used AVspoof database,
which contains a comprehensive set of presentation attacks,
including, (i) direct replay attacks when a genuine data
is played back using a laptop and two phones (Samsung
Galaxy S4 and iPhone 3G), (ii) synthesized speech replayed
with a laptop, and (iii) speech created with a voice conver-
sion algorithm, also replayed with a laptop.
The paper states competition goals, describes the
database and the evaluation protocol, discusses solutions
for spoofing or presentation attack detection submitted by
the participants, and presents the results of the evaluation.
1. Introduction
Despite the growing usage and increasing reliability of
automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems, they are
shown to be vulnerable to presentation or spoofing attacks.
In such attack, an invalid user attempts to gain access to the
system by presenting counterfeit (fake) speech sample(s) as
∗Except for the first two organizers, authors are in no particular order.
the evidence of a valid user. Counterfeit speech can be syn-
thesized from text, converted using speech of another per-
son, or simply replayed using some playback device, e.g., a
mobile phone.
The participants in this anti-spoofing competition pro-
posed presentation attack detection (PAD) techniques to
protect an ASV system against presentation attacks. Es-
sentially, these techniques should effectively separate real
(genuine) speech recordings from spoofed speech (attacks).
Compared to the previously conducted ASVspoof [14]
anti-spoofing challenge, which considered only synthetic
speech attacks that bypass the microphone (coined as ‘log-
ical access’ attacks), this competition focuses on a more
practical replay attacks, which are broadly defined as pre-
sentation attacks by ISO standardization committee [7]. Al-
though presentation attacks are considered important by the
industry, they received considerably less attention, since,
until now, there was no dataset with such attacks.
In this competition, we used a recent publicly available
AVspoof [9] database1, which provides a comprehensive
variety of presentation attacks, including attacks when a
genuine data is played back to an ASV system using lap-
top speakers, high quality speakers, and two mobile phones.
Synthetic speech attacks, such as speech synthesis and voice
conversion replayed with laptop speakers, are also included.
The participants were provided with two non-
overlapping sets (each containing real and spoofed
1https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/avspoof
data subsets) for training and calibration of their PAD
systems. The submitted systems were evaluated on a
separate independent testing set, which, besides the attacks
present in AVspoof database, also included additional
‘unknown’ attacks.
Table 1: Number of utterances in AVspoof subsets. ‘SS’
stands for speech synthesis, ‘VC’ for voice conversion, and
‘RE’ for replay. ‘LP’ indicates laptop, ‘PH1’ is Samsung
Galaxy S4 phone, ‘PH2’ is iPhone 3GS, ‘PH3’ is iPhone
6S, and ‘HQ’ means high quality speakers were used during
replay.
Type of data Train Dev Test
genuine data 4973 4995 5576
all attacks 38580 38580 44920
SS-LP-LP 490 490 560
SS-LP-HQ-LP 490 490 560
VC-LP-LP 17400 17400 19500
VC-LP-HQ-LP 17400 17400 19500
RE-LP-LP 700 700 800
RE-LP-HQ-LP 700 700 800
RE-PH1-LP 700 700 800
RE-PH2-LP 700 700 800
RE-PH2-PH3 - - 800
RE-LPPH2-PH3 - - 800
2. Database
AVspoof, a publicly available database1 used in the com-
petition, contains real (genuine) speech samples from 44
participants (31 males and 13 females) recorded over the
period of two months in four sessions, each scheduled sev-
eral days apart in different setups and environmental con-
ditions such as background noises. The first session was
recorded in the most controlled conditions. Speech sam-
ples were recorded using three devices: laptop using mi-
crophone AT2020USB+, Samsung Galaxy S4 phone, and
iPhone 3GS, with the following types of samples recorded:
(1) reading part of 10 or 40 pre-defined sentences read by
subjects, (2) pass-phrases part of 5 short prompts read by
subjects, and (3) free speech part of a free speech about any
topic for 3 to 10 minutes.
To have an unbiased evaluation, the samples of the
database are split into three non-overlapping subsets: train-
ing, development, and test. Each subset consists of two
main parts: (i) real or genuine data and (ii) several differ-
ent presentation attacks (see Table 1).
When generating presentation attacks, the assumption is
that a verification system is installed on a laptop (with an in-
ternal built-in microphone) and an attacker is trying to gain
access to this system by playing back to it a pre-recorded
genuine data or an automatically generated synthetic data
using some playback device. In AVspoof database, presen-
tation attacks consist of (i) direct replay attacks when a gen-
uine data is played back using a laptop with internal speak-
ers, a laptop with external high quality speakers, Samsung
Galaxy S4 phone, and iPhone 3G, (ii) synthesized speech
replayed with a laptop and HQ speakers, and (iii) converted
voice attacks replayed with a laptop and HQ speakers.
New attacks in Test set To make competition more chal-
lenging, additional attacks were recorded for the test set to
introduce ‘unknown’ types of attacks, which allow to access
submissions for a scenario when not all attacks are known
a priori (a common situation in practice).
Therefore, two types of replay attacks were recorded: (i)
the data recorded with iPhone 3G was replayed to an iPhone
6S and (ii) the original data from the test set was replayed
to an iPhone 6S. These types of attacks simulate two differ-
ent practical scenarios, in the first case, it is assumed that
the attacker obtained the required audio samples by secretly
recording them with a mobile phone (iPhone 3G) and, in
the second case, the attacker simply has stolen the original
data. These attacks were played to iPhone 6S to simulate
the situation when the verification system is installed on a
mobile device.
Table 1 presents the detailed view of the database and
how it was split into training, development, and test sets.
The rows of the table correspond to different types of data,
including different attacks. For instance, ‘SS-LP-HQ-LP’
means that synthesized samples were played back using lap-
top with high quality speakers connected to it and the target
verification system is assumed to be running on a laptop as
well. Similarly, attack ‘RE-PH2-PH3’ means that data was
first recorded with iPhone 3G and then played back using
the same phone to iPhone 6S, where the verification sys-
tem is assumed to be running. However, in ‘RE-LPPH2-
PH3’, the original data that was recorded with a laptop is
replayed using iPhone 3G (i.e., it was stolen by the attacker)
to iPhone 6S.
3. Evaluation protocol
Training and development sets were released to the par-
ticipants at the start of the competition, so they had enough
time to train their proposed PAD systems on the training set
and tune it on the development set. Once the scores for the
development set were submitted, the test set was released,
with all data anonymized (randomized file names with no
information on what is real data or attacks), to assess and
rank the accuracy of the proposed systems. In addition to
having two new attacks, test set also contained 5473 anchor
samples (with randomized file names) from the develop-
ment set. Since participants were not aware about the exis-
tence of the anchor files, it allowed us to determine whether
each final submitted system was the same that was used to
generate the development set scores, by checking that score
values for anchor files in test and development sets match
exactly.
The evaluation of the PAD systems was done based on
the false acceptance rate (FAR) and the false rejection rate
(FRR), which depend on a certain threshold θ:
FAR(θ) =
|{hattack | hattack ≥ θ}|
|{hattack}|
FRR(θ) =
|{hreal | hreal < θ}|
|{hreal}| ,
(1)
where hreal is a score for real or genuine data and hattack
is a score for the attack or spoofed data.
We use the development set to determine threshold θdev ,
based on the equal error rate (EER) of the evaluated sys-
tem. The final evaluation performance is then computed as
the half total error rate (HTER) (more details about the pro-
posed evaluation can be found in [4]):








The main goal for using the proposed evaluation protocol
is to apply the same evaluation conditions to all participants.
Such approach allows a fair and objective comparison be-
tween different submissions.
4. Baseline system
A baseline PAD system2 was provided to participants
as an example of the working system with EER to beat.
The baseline system is based on the open source Bob tool-
box [1]. The provided system uses simple spectrogram-
based ratios as features and logistic regression as a classi-
fier, which is a relatively simple setup that should be easy
to beat.
Prior to computing features, a given audio sample is first
split into overlapping 20ms-long speech frames with a 10ms
overlap. The frames are pre-emphasized with 0.97 coeffi-
cient and pre-processed by applying Hamming window. A
power spectrum is computed from the preprocessed signal
and is filtered with 40 Mel-scale triangular filters, resulting
in 40 spectral bands of the signal. These bands are split into
10 sub-bands, and one average value is computed for each
sub-band in both dimensions: within 4 bands and across
signal length. The ratios between these 10 average values
2Source code: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bob.paper.btas c2016
result in 10-values feature vector. Vectors from the train-
ing set are used to train a logical regression classifier, while
features from development set are used to compute devel-
opment scores and determine the threshold.
The EER of the baseline system is 5.91% on the develop-
ment set, so the goal of participants was to develop a system
that can beat this value and also perform well on the test set
with added ‘unknown’ attacks.
5. Submitted approaches
Seven different teams from around the world registered
for the competition and four teams submitted their results
for development and test sets.
5.1. Submission by ‘CPqD’ team
This system relies on two types of features that are ex-
tracted from each speech signal. First type is 20 Mel-
frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) [5] and their deltas
that were computed on frame-by-frame basis and then aver-
aged. Then, another set of cepstrum coefficients was com-
puted using the following steps: given a windowed frame
yk of the signal, compute its Fourier transform and consider
only its magnitude Yk = |F (yk)|. Compute the average of
Y for the whole signal, normalize it and take the log of the








The log of the magnitude of the inverse Fourier trans-
form of mY lead to the cepstrum coefficients.
Model description As a classifier model, the system uses
a neural network for binary classification. It aggregates all
attacks in an “attack” class. The neural network has the fol-
lowing architecture: (i) two hidden layers (10 and 64 neu-
rons each) with relu activation function, (ii) dropout in the
first hidden layer, and (iii) data was scaled before passing to
the neural network.
Auxiliary training data In addition to the provided
dataset, an ASVspoof [14] dataset from the Interspeech
2015 challenge was also used to enhance the training data
and, hopefully, avoid model over-fitting to the given dataset.
The reasoning is that machine learning-based models tend
to look at specific features of the loudspeakers and micro-
phones used in the training audios, and have problems when
audios provided from other devices or that do not contain
such patterns (different attacks, for example).
































(a) Dev set with EER values
































(b) Test set with HTER values
Figure 1: DET curves for all submissions computed for development and test sets.
Table 2: Evaluation results (error rates are in percentages) for the development and test sets.
Team EER (Dev) FAR (Test) FRR (Test) HTER (Test)
Baseline 5.91 5.74 8.01 6.87
CPqD 2.74 7.23 5.38 6.30
SJTUSpeech 0.42 2.42 1.98 2.205
Idiap 0.00 0.54 3.54 2.04
IITKGP ABSP 0.00 1.36 1.16 1.26
5.2. Submission by ‘SJTUSpeech’ team
This system is closely related to the authors’ previ-
ous work in speaker verification [10]. A traditional 39-
dimensional CMVN was used with normalized PLP fea-
tures [6] in a 10ms frame-window as the base features.
These features are fed into the respective classifier and pro-
duce a fixed size representation from a given hidden layer.
Two base classifiers consist of a 7 Layer DNN and a 4 Layer
BLSTM. Similarly to the approach in [3], all networks use
four output neurons, representing the three spoofing types
(voice conversion, speech synthesis, and replay) in addition
to the genuine class.
DNN The features are extended with a 15 × 15 context
window, resulting in a 1209-dimensional feature vector,
which is fed into the network. DNN contains 1024 neurons
in every hidden layer. After each linear layer, in addition
to dropout, batch normalization is applied. During training,
60 iterations of adadelta optimization is also run3.
BLSTM The second classifier contains a 4 Layer Net-
work with two sigmoid activations surrounding two layers
of LSTM. The 39-dimensional PLP features are fed into the
model and it is then trained for 10 iterations with adam as
3https://gitlab.com/Richy/BTAS2016
the optimization method3. As the result, the output of the
last hidden layer is used as a valid 512 dimensional repre-
sentation of the spoofing type.
Fusion Based on the development set, the relation be-
tween utterance length and error rate was analyzed with
conclusion that the BLSTM’s error distribution is shifted
towards short utterances. The same analysis on the DNN
revealed that it is less error-prone to short utterances. Thus
a combination of the DNN and BLSTM feature vectors was
done3 to create a 1560 dimensional representation. These
vectors are used as the input to our scoring method.
Scores are obtained by using a Gaussian function as
a classifier by running scikit linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) framework4 implementation to model the genuine
utterances as a single model with a Gaussian distribution
and directly calculate log likelihoods by scoring these mod-
els against all utterances in the dataset. Thus, for each utter-
ance, the score value is near 0 (log(1)) if the model and the
utterance do match with each other (i.e., genuine) and the
score is lower than zero if they do not match (i.e., spoofed
utterances).
4http://scikit-learn.org/0.16/modules/generated/sklearn.lda.LDA.html
5For SJTUSpeech, 1% of scores from anchor files planted in test set
differed from scores compared to development set. The team could not
explain this discrepancy.
Table 3: Per attack results (HTER %) from all submissions for test set.
Attacks Baseline CPqD SJTUSpeech Idiap IITKGP ABSP
All together 6.87 6.30 2.205 2.04 1.26
SS-LP-LP 2.87 5.89 1.88 0.27 0.68
SS-LP-HQ-LP 2.87 7.81 1.75 0.27 0.68
VC-LP-LP 3.58 4.92 1.73 0.33 0.74
VC-LP-HQ-LP 3.39 6.16 1.81 0.27 0.81
RE-LP-LP 17.02 16.53 10.34 15.83 8.58
RE-LP-HQ-LP 11.24 9.80 10.02 0.58 1.81
RE-PH1-LP 52.24 9.30 1.52 0.33 0.68
RE-PH2-LP 51.96 23.46 2.05 25.18 3.59
RE-PH2-PH3 51.56 36.43 2.84 50.08 6.49
RE-LPPH2-PH3 20.62 31.30 18.09 46.64 23.06
5.3. Submission by ‘Idiap’ team
Please note that this team was treated in the same way as
other participants and was not aware about the details of the
competition and differences in data and protocol. The sub-
mitted system is based on long-term spectral mean and stan-
dard deviation. Each utterance is split into frames of 32ms
with a shift of 10ms. Each frame is first pre-emphasized to
enhance the high frequencies and a discrete Fourier trans-
form (DFT) is taken. Then, the mean µ[k] and the standard
deviation σ[k] are computed over all the frames of the log












(log |Xm[k]| − µ[k])2,
(4)
where Xm[k] is the kth coefficient of the DFT of the mth
frame, k = 0 . . . N2 − 1, m = 1 . . .M , with N the length of
a frame, and M is the number of frames extracted from the
utterance.
The resulting feature vector is the concatenation of the
mean vector with the standard deviation vector. Given that
the frames are computed over 32ms and the sampling fre-
quency is 16kHz, a feature vector of 512 components per
utterance is obtained.
The feature vectors are classified using a classifier based
on LDA. The input features are projected onto one dimen-
sion with an LDA and the obtained values are directly used
as scores. The performance achieved with this simple linear
classifier shows that long-term spectral statistics are highly
discriminative features.
The motivation for using these features is twofold.
First, a long-term spectral mean (or a long-term average
spectrum) is widely used as a measure of voice qual-
ity [8], which is meaningful in presentation attacks detec-
tion, since it captures information about channel degrada-
tion and speech “naturalness”. Although cepstral mean and
standard deviation (directly related to the long-term spec-
tral mean and standard deviation) are traditionally removed
from the signal in speech and speaker recognition systems,
they are more robust to channel variability. Hence, this in-
formation is useful to detect presentation attacks as they are
played back to the system, leading to channel degradation.
5.4. Submission by ‘IITKGP ABSP’ team
This anti-spoofing system is based on the score-level fu-
sion of two sub-systems. It uses two different spectral fea-
tures: (MFCCs) [5] and inverted MFCCs (IMFCCs) [2], re-
spectively. The feature extraction of both the sub-systems is
followed by Gaussian mixture model-maximum likelihood
(GMM-ML) [12] classifier with the log-likelihood ratio as
the scores. Feature vectors are computed with a frame
size of 20ms and overlap of 50%. Speech activity detec-
tor (SAD) is not employed as non-speech frames could be
helpful for spoofing detection [13]. The feature extractors
are optimized on the development data. Both features are
extracted using 20 filters in the filter bank. Energy coeffi-
cient is retained to formulate 20-dimensional feature vec-
tor with only static coefficients. There are 10 iterations of
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate pa-
rameters of two GMMs (real/genuine and spoofed) with ML
criteria [11]. The number of mixture components is set at
512. The log-likelihood score is calculated as,
Λ(X) = L(X|λreal)− L(X|λattack), (5)
where X = {x1, . . . ,xT } is the feature matrix of the
test utterance, T is the number of frames and L(X|λ) =
(1/T )
∑T
t=1 log p(xt|λ) is the average log-likelihood of X
given GMM model λ. λreal and λattack correspond to the
GMM models that are generated from genuine and replay
spoofed speech samples respectively. The final score is
computed as the linear fusion of scores for MFCCs and IM-
FCCs, and it is expressed as,
Λfused(X) = (1− α)Λmfcc(X) + αΛimfcc(X) (6)
where, Λmfcc(X) and Λimfcc(X) are two log-likelihood ra-
tio scores for two features, respectively, and α = 0.5.
6. Evaluation of submissions
Prior to computing error rates, the test scores were
checked for consistency with the development scores us-
ing the anchor files present in both sets (see Section 3 for
details). All participants, except for SJTUSpeech team, had
exact matching scores for all 5473 anchor files. For SJTUS-
peech, 56 anchor files (about 1%) had mismatched scores in
test and development sets, but since the mismatched values
would not affect the resulted error rates, the team’s results
were accepted in the competition.
The evaluation results2 for the submitted systems are
presented in Table 2, where EER values characterize perfor-
mances on the development set and FAR, FRR, and HTER
values summarize the performances on the test set. Figure 1
shows DET curves, presenting a more detailed overview of
the submissions performances on both sets.
To demonstrate how different types of attacks affect dif-
ferent systems, we show HTER value for each separate at-
tack from the test set in Table 3, which can be related to the
number of samples in each attack given in Table 1. Please
note that the last two rows of the tables correspond to new
attacks (see Section 2) that are added in the test set but were
not available in training or development sets.
From Table 3, it can be noted that all submitted systems
demonstrate difficulty in detecting new attacks added in the
test set. Also, since database contained disproportionally
more samples generated with voice conversion, the overall
HTER results were lower for those systems that were more
successful in detecting this specific type of attack. There-
fore, a more unbiased way to compare systems would be to
look at the performance for each different attack.
7. Conclusion
The evaluation results of the competition demonstrated
that presentation attacks still pose a serious challenge to
some of the most advanced presentation attack detection
systems. The attacks for which the systems were not specif-
ically trained were particularly challenging. These ‘un-
known’ attacks are often expected in a practical scenario.
Therefore, new PAD methods need to be developed, which
can capture general spoofing information to generalize well
for different types of attacks. New datasets with larger vari-
ety of practical setups and capturing conditions (noise, mi-
crophones, speakers, etc.) are also necessary.
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